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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
According  to the  dual  systems  perspective,  risk  taking  peaks  during  adolescence  because  activation  of  an
early-maturing  socioemotional-incentive  processing  system  ampliﬁes  adolescents’  afﬁnity  for  exciting,
pleasurable,  and  novel  activities  at a time  when  a still immature  cognitive  control  system  is not  yet
strong  enough  to consistently  restrain  potentially  hazardous  impulses.  We  review  evidence  from  both
the psychological  and  neuroimaging  literatures  that has emerged  since  2008,  when  this  perspective  was
originally  articulated.  Although  there  are occasional  exceptions  to the general  trends,  studies  show  that,
as predicted,  psychological  and neural  manifestations  of  reward  sensitivity  increase  between  childhood
and  adolescence,  peak  sometime  during  the  late  teen  years,  and  decline  thereafter,  whereas  psychological
and  neural  reﬂections  of better  cognitive  control  increase  gradually  and  linearly  throughout  adolescence
and  into  the  early  20s.  While  some  forms  of  real-world  risky  behavior  peak  at  a later  age  than  predicted,eward sensitivity
ognitive control
this  likely  reﬂects  differential  opportunities  for risk-taking  in late  adolescence  and  young  adulthood,
rather  than  neurobiological  differences  that  make  this  age  group  more  reckless.  Although  it is  admittedly
an  oversimpliﬁcation,  as  a heuristic  device,  the  dual systems  model  provides  a far  more  accurate  account
of adolescent  risk  taking  than  prior  models  that  have  attributed  adolescent  recklessness  to cognitive
deﬁciencies.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Social scientists and casual observers of human development
ave long noted that the transitional period between childhood
nd adulthood is a time of heightened risk-taking. Indeed, despite
he relative absence of illness and disease during this period,
ates of morbidity and mortality increase substantially in adoles-
ence, largely due to risk taking. The question of why  adolescents
eem predisposed toward recklessness is age-old; however, work
n the ﬁeld of developmental psychology, and more recently,
evelopmental neuroscience, has provided new insights into the
henomenon.
For many years psychologists had attempted to explain ado-
escent recklessness as a consequence of cognitive deﬁciencies in
oung people’s thinking, including irrationality, poor information
rocessing, and ignorance about risk. As we have noted in previ-
us publications (e.g., Steinberg, 2008), these accounts have been
argely undermined by available evidence. Generally speaking, by
ge 15 or so, adolescents perform as well as adults on tasks measur-
ng logical reasoning, information processing, and risk perception.
. The emergence of dual systems models
About a decade ago, the budding ﬁeld of developmental cog-
itive neuroscience began to provide insight into how patterns of
rain development might explain aspects of adolescent decision-
aking (see, e.g. Dahl, 2004). In 2008, our lab at Temple University
Steinberg, 2008; Steinberg et al., 2008) and Casey’s lab at Cor-
ell (Casey et al., 2008) simultaneously proposed similar variations
f a “dual systems” account of adolescent decision-making. This
erspective attributes adolescents’ vulnerability to risky, often
eckless, behavior in part to the divergent developmental courses
f two brain systems: one (localized in the striatum, as well as the
edial and orbital prefrontal cortices) that increases motivation
o pursue rewards and one (encompassing the lateral prefrontal,
ateral parietal, and anterior cingulate cortices) that restrains
mprudent impulses (see e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Duckworth and
teinberg, 2015; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Luna and Wright,
016; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Steinberg, 2008). Speciﬁcally,
t proposes that risk-taking behaviors peak during adolescence
ecause activation of an early-maturing incentive-processing sys-
em (the “socioemotional system”) ampliﬁes adolescents’ afﬁnity
or exciting, novel, and risky activities, while a countervailing, but
lower to mature, “cognitive control” system is not yet far enough
long in its development to consistently restrain potentially haz-
rdous impulses.
Several variations on this dual systems model have been pro-
osed. The version that guides our work (Steinberg, 2008) is very
imilar to that proposed by Casey et al. (2008). Both conceive
f a slowly developing cognitive control system, which contin-
es to mature through late adolescence. However, whereas we
ropose that the socioemotional system follows an inverted-U
haped developmental course, such that responsiveness to reward
ncreases in early adolescence and declines in early adulthood,
asey et al. have portrayed the socioemotional system as increas-
ng in arousability until mid-adolescence, at which point it reaches
 plateau, remaining at this level into adulthood. Furthermore, our
ersion of the dual systems model posits that the decline in socioe-
otional arousability occurs independently of the development of
he control system, whereas Casey et al.’s model proposes that the
trengthening of the cognitive control system causes the socioe-
otional system to become less arousable. More recently, Luna
nd Wright (2016) have proposed another variation on the dual
ystems model (the “driven dual systems” model), which, like our
odel, hypothesizes an inverted-U shaped trajectory of socioemo-
ional arousability, but, unlike our model, hypothesizes a trajectory
f cognitive control that plateaus in mid-adolescence rather thanve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
continuing to increase into the 20s, as suggested by us and by Casey
et al. In a similar vein, Luciana and Collins (2012) endorse a model
that emphasizes the role of a hyperactive socioemotional system
(“subcortical limbic-striatal systems” in their terminology) under-
mining the regulatory ability of the cognitive control system (the
“prefrontal executive system”) resulting in greater risk-taking dur-
ing adolescence. Like Luna and Wright, Luciana and Collins argue
that the development of cognitive control is complete by mid-
adolescence, as evidenced by adolescents’ adult-like performance
on non-affective measures of cognitive capacity. Fig. 1 illustrates
the similarities and differences between these versions of the dual
systems model.
Another perspective, Ernst’s (2014) triadic model, expands on
the dual systems concept by hypothesizing that a third brain
system—one responsible for emotional intensity and avoidance,
anchored in the amygdala—is also important for understanding the
developmental differences in “motivated behavior.” With respect
to the type of reward-seeking risky behavior that the dual systems
models seek to explain, Ernst (2014) speculates that this emo-
tion/avoidance system may  serve to boost impulsive decisions in
adolescence by amplifying the perceived cost of delay. She also
proposes that this system may  become hypoactive—dampening
avoidance impulses—in the face of a potential reward that acti-
vates the socioemotional system. While this model is intuitively
appealing, there is not much evidence to date indicating that the
emotion/avoidance system and its developmental trajectory help
to explain heightened levels of risk taking in adolescence. Also, the
role of the amygdala in decision-making is not yet clear (see e.g.,
Somerville et al., 2014). Therefore, our review does not address this
third hypothesized system.
2. The current article
In this article, we review evidence from both the behavioral and
neuroimaging literatures that has emerged since the dual systems
model was originally articulated in 2008. In particular, we consider
the degree to which extant research ﬁndings support, extend, mod-
ify, and challenge the theory. We  focus our discussion on three main
propositions of the model: (1) that reward sensitivity peaks in ado-
lescence; (2) that cognitive control increases linearly during this
period; and (3) that heightened risk-taking during adolescence is
the product of heightened reward-seeking and relatively weaker
cognitive control.
We  begin by addressing a recent criticism of the basic premise
that middle adolescence is an especially intensiﬁed period of risky
behavior. We  then examine evidence regarding the trajectory
of sensation seeking across development, the reward processing
circuitry that might underlie developmental changes in sensation-
seeking behavior, and the extent to which heightened sensation
seeking and reward sensitivity are related to pubertal develop-
ment. Next, we survey evidence on the developmental trajectory
of the ability to control impulsive behavior through self-regulatory
processes, and on the maturation of the brain’s cognitive control
network, which is proposed to undergird this ability. Finally, we
consider evidence concerning the interaction of the two  proposed
systems during risky decision making, identify several unresolved
issues, and offer some recommendations for how they might be
addressed in future research.
In examining how recent evidence informs the dual systems
model, we  are cognizant of critiques of this viewpoint, including
contentions that the model inadequately accounts for studies
that do not ﬁnd adolescents to be particularly sensitive to reward
(Pfeifer and Allen, 2012; but see Strang et al., 2013 for a response
to this critique), that cognitive control does not unequivocally
improve during adolescence (Crone and Dahl, 2012), and that
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by centuries. And yet, empirical evidence of a mid-adolescent peak
in risk taking (at least in humans) is not unequivocal. As pointed
out in a recent review of epidemiological data, the peak age












Risk TakingFig. 1. Alternative theoretical models of the development of the socioemotion
dolescence may  not actually be a peak period of vulnerability to
isk-taking (e.g., Defoe et al., 2014; Willoughby et al., 2013; but see
rnst, 2014 for a response to Willoughby et al.). We  brieﬂy address
hese critiques here.
We do not disagree with a fourth critique of the dual sys-
ems model—that it is insufﬁciently nuanced (Pfeifer and Allen,
012)—because this is almost certainly correct. However, we
elieve that even an admittedly simpliﬁed model can serve as a
seful heuristic and, more important, can help to motivate research
eeded to ﬂesh out the details of an initially simplistic account (for
 full discussion see Strang et al., 2013). Moreover, given the inﬂu-
nce this perspective continues to have on legal policy and practice,
ublic health, and popular discourse about adolescence (Steinberg,
014), it is important to ask whether this simpliﬁed account is
elpful or misguided.
It may  be useful at this juncture to clarify our terminology. To
egin, the term “adolescence” warrants discussion. Largely as a
atter of convenience, scholars generally agree that adolescence
egins when pubertal development becomes evident, around age
0 (somewhat later among males). The end of adolescence—the
ttainment of adult status—is not easily pegged to any single biolog-
cal or social event, however. In research, adulthood is often deﬁned
s beginning at either age 18 or 21, the two ages most often tied
o legal majority in the developed world. However, given that 18-
o 21-year-olds in industrialized societies are rarely regarded out-
ide the legal system as fully mature adults, and typically have not
ttained many of the traditional markers of adult status (e.g., ﬁnan-
ial independence, completion of formal education, stable romantic
elationships, full-time employment, parenthood), we prefer to
efer to this age range as “late adolescence.” For purposes of this
aper, our focus is mainly on the second decade of life, from about
ges 10 to 21, which we  subdivide into early adolescence (10–13),
iddle adolescence (14–17), and late adolescence (18–21).
Another source of confusion in discussions of the dual systems
erspective concerns levels of analysis, since the perspective refers
o overt behaviors (such as risk taking), the psychological states
ypothesized to motivate them (such as sensation seeking), and
he neural processes believed to undergird these states (such as
eward sensitivity). In an earlier paper (Smith et al., 2013), we  sug-
ested that “reward sensitivity” and “cognitive control” be used to
efer to the neurobiological constructs that are measured in stud-
es of brain structure or function (see Fig. 2). These neurobiological
henomena have psychological manifestations (in our terminol-
gy, “sensation seeking” and “self-regulation”) that are measured
y assessing psychological states or traits through the subjective
eports of individuals or their evaluators.
For heuristic purposes, we use “sensation seeking” as an over-
rching label for a number of interrelated constructs that refer
o the inclination to pursue “varied, novel, complex, and intense
ensations and experiences and the willingness to take physical,
ocial, legal, and ﬁnancial risks for the sake of such experi-
nces” (Zuckerman, 1994, p. 26). Recruitment of brain regions andward processing) and cognitive control systems from about age 10 to age 25.
systems implicated in reward-processing (e.g., ventral striatum,
orbitofrontal cortex) has been linked to measures of sensation seek-
ing in humans and other animals (Abler et al., 2006; Leyton et al.,
2002; Lind et al., 2005). In a similar vein, we use the label “self-
regulation” to refer to a group of interrelated but distinguishable
constructs that refer to the capacity to deliberately modulate one’s
thoughts, feelings, or actions in the pursuit of planned goals; among
these constructs are impulse control, response inhibition, emotion
regulation, and attentional control. Aspects of self-regulation have
been linked to the functioning of brain regions and systems that
subserve cognitive control (e.g., lateral prefrontal, lateral parietal,
and anterior cingulate cortices) (Luna et al., 2010; Mennigen et al.,
2014).
Variations in sensation seeking and self-regulation, in turn, are
associated with variations in behaviors, including risk taking, which
can be measured through objective reports or observations. In our
model, risk taking is a subset of many aspects of decision making
that share some, but not all, characteristics in common. Further-
more, as Fig. 2 indicates, all decision making takes place within a
broader context that encourages and enables some acts but discour-
ages and prohibits others. As we  discuss, the fact that adolescents’
risk taking is inﬂuenced by the broader context in which it occurs
makes it difﬁcult to move seamlessly between laboratory studies
and the real world.
3. Are adolescents particularly prone to risk taking?
Allusions to adolescence as a time of rash behavior and poor
decision making predate the articulation of the dual systems modelContext
Fig. 2. Constructs implicated in the dual systems model of adolescent risk-taking






























































o06 E.P. Shulman et al. / Developmental C
t is late adolescents, not middle adolescents, who exhibit the
ighest levels of recklessness (see Willoughby et al., 2013). For
xample, one of the most dangerous forms of substance use—binge
rinking—is most common during the early 20s (Chassin et al.,
002; Willoughby et al., 2013).
Although some argue that these data pose a problem for the dual
ystems model, we disagree. The model does not posit that middle
dolescents necessarily demonstrate the highest levels of all forms
f risk taking in the real world. Rather, it asserts that risk-taking
ropensity is highest in mid-adolescence, but that the expression
f this propensity is expected to vary depending on the context (as
oted in Fig. 2). Our position is that late adolescents are less biologi-
ally predisposed to risk taking than middle adolescents (consistent
ith the dual systems model), but that they exhibit higher levels of
any forms of real-world risk-taking due to greater opportunity.
ompared to younger individuals, people in their early 20s typi-
ally experience less supervision from adults, have more ﬁnancial
esources, and are afforded greater legal access to many forms of
isk taking (e.g., driving, alcohol, and gambling). Thus, we  contend
hat maturational factors predispose middle adolescents to greater
isk taking, but that social and legal factors constrain their oppor-
unities to realize this predisposition. Simply put, it is far easier for
he average 21-year-old to take risks with alcohol, cars, and gam-
ling than it is for the average 15-year-old. If 15-year-olds were
ermitted to drive, purchase alcohol, and enter casinos legally, our
rediction is that they would likely crash, binge drink, and gamble
ore than people in their early 20s.
.1. Risk taking in the laboratory
In an effort to investigate age differences in risk-taking propen-
ity, unconfounded by age differences in opportunity, researchers
ave tested adolescent and adult participants using artiﬁcial
asks—typically gambling games and driving simulations—that give
hem the option to take risks in the safety of a laboratory set-
ing. While such tasks are often lacking in ecological validity, they
o have the advantage of controlling for contextual differences
etween adolescents and other age groups, as well as for age dif-
erences in behavior preferences. These studies yield inconsistent
esults, with some ﬁnding greater risk taking in adolescence than
n adulthood (e.g., Burnett et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2008; Van
eijenhorst et al., 2008, 2010a), others ﬁnding no age effects (e.g.,
jork et al., 2007; Eshel et al., 2007; de Water et al., 2014), and
till others ﬁnding that adolescents engage in less risk taking com-
ared to children (Paulsen et al., 2011). These inconsistent ﬁndings
uggest that if there is an increased risk taking propensity in ado-
escence it may  only manifest under certain conditions (see Defoe
t al., 2014 for a recent meta-analysis).
Recently, researchers have used laboratory tasks and manip-
lations that better approximate certain aspects of real-life risky
ecision-making. These studies have helped to delineate the con-
itions under which adolescents may  be more predisposed than
ther age groups to take risks. For example, noting that during most
eal-world risk taking the actual chances of a positive or negative
utcome are unknown, researchers recently tested whether age
ifferences in risk taking depend on whether the probabilities of
 successful outcome are known or unknown (Tymula et al., 2012,
013). Tymula and colleagues (2012) had adolescents and adults
omplete a risk-taking task with two different conditions: a “known
isk” condition and an “ambiguous risk” condition. In the “known
isk” condition, participants chose between a sure bet (100% chance
f receiving $5) and a “risky” bet with known reward probabili-
ies (e.g., a 50% chance of winning $50, versus $0 if they lost). In
he “ambiguous risk” condition, participants again chose between
 sure and risky option, but this time the likelihood of winning
r losing on the risky option was unknown. Compared to adults,ve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
adolescents made fewer risky decisions when the probabilities of
loss were known (i.e., adolescents were less risk tolerant). However,
when the probabilities were unknown, adolescents made signif-
icantly more risky decisions than adults. Thus, under conditions
that are more representative of real-life risk-taking (where risk
probabilities are typically unknown), adolescents evince a greater
risk-taking propensity than adults.
Another way  in which real-life risk taking differs from risk tak-
ing in the laboratory is with respect to emotional arousal. Contexts
in which risk taking occurs outside the lab are often thrilling or
frightening; in the lab, both the nature of the risk taking (the stakes
and considerations involved) and the surrounding environment
are typically less exciting. Scholars have argued that differences
in arousal give rise to fundamentally different ways of processing
information (e.g., Luna and Wright, 2016; Metcalfe and Mischel,
1999). The dual systems model holds that, to the extent that
decision-making occurs under conditions that arouse the socioe-
motional system (e.g., conditions that are relatively more thrilling),
differences between adolescent and adult decision-making and,
hence, risk taking will be more pronounced. This pattern was
observed in one study that experimentally manipulated the degree
to which a card game risk-taking task was affectively arousing
(Figner et al., 2009). Consistent with the dual systems account, ado-
lescents evinced greater risk taking and poorer use of risk-relevant
information than adults, but only in the more arousing version of
the task.
A third difference between most laboratory risk-taking tasks
and real-life risk taking is that, in the laboratory, adolescents are
asked to make decisions when they are alone, whereas the major-
ity of risky behaviors during adolescence occur in groups (Albert
et al., 2013). To mimic  this context in the lab, researchers have
employed experimental manipulations in which adolescents com-
plete risk-taking tasks in the presence of peers (real or illusory).
Some studies have asked participants to bring same-aged peers to
the lab (Chein et al., 2011; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Kretsch and
Harden, 2014), while others have deceived participants into believ-
ing that they are being observed remotely by a peer (Smith et al.,
2014a). Not only does the “presence” of peers increase the ecolog-
ical validity of the risk-taking task (because adolescent risk taking
often occurs in groups), but it also appears to elevate emotional
arousal, which further increases the comparability to real-world
risk-taking contexts.
Studies that have manipulated the social context have found
that adolescents are more induced by peer presence to take risks
than are adults (Chein et al., 2011; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005;
Smith et al., 2014a). These ﬁndings, which are largely consis-
tent with other studies of peer effects on adolescent driving [e.g.,
Segalowitz et al., 2012; see Lambert et al. (2014) for a review], sug-
gest that adolescents are particularly vulnerable to the effects of
peer presence on risk-taking behaviors. Moreover, neuroimaging
data suggest that the effect of peer presence on risk taking is due
to increased affective arousal, as evidenced by greater activation
of brain regions within the socioemotional system (Chein et al.,
2011). A recent extension of this line of work in our lab using a
rodent model found that adolescent mice, but not adult mice, con-
sume more alcohol in the presence of same-aged conspeciﬁcs than
when alone (Logue et al., 2014).
Overall, then, there is evidence for increased risk taking in
adolescence compared to adulthood, though developmental dif-
ferences may  only be evident under certain conditions, such as
emotional arousal, ambiguous risk, and the presence of others.
The tendency for adolescents to engage in more risky behaviors in
highly-arousing contexts together with increased engagement of
their socioemotional system during peer observation point to the
importance of reward processing in decision making during this
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. The development of sensation seeking and reward
ensitivity
Increased adolescent risk taking in contexts that are emotion-
lly arousing is consistent with one of the central tenets of the
ual systems model—that activation and reactivity of the socioe-
otional system reaches its peak during mid- to late adolescence.
 growing literature interrogates this aspect of the model by exam-
ning the psychological and neurological evidence for heightened
esponsiveness of the socioemotional system during adolescence,
ncluding in situations that do not involve risky decision-making.
his is important because the dual systems model proposes that the
ocioemotional system is more responsive generally in adolescence
han at other ages, not only in the context of risk taking.
Moreover, the model hypothesizes that the developmental
ourse of the socioemotional system is, unlike the development
f the cognitive control system, closely tied to pubertal develop-
ent (for review see Smith et al., 2013). Around age 12 (for boys)
r 11 (for girls), pubertal hormones inundate the brain, trigger-
ng a series of changes in neural structure and function (Euling
t al., 2008; Schulz et al., 2009), especially in dopamine-rich lim-
ic regions associated with reward processing (Blakemore et al.,
010; Sinclair et al., 2014). It is thought that these hormone-related
hanges sensitize the adolescent brain to reward (Forbes and Dahl,
010; Peper and Dahl, 2013), as appears to be the case in ani-
al  studies (Alexander et al., 1994; Clark et al., 1996; Miele et al.,
988). More speciﬁcally, the reward system is particularly sensitive
o the sudden surge of hormones at the start of puberty, height-
ning sensitivity to affective stimuli. Although pubertal hormones
o not decline into adulthood, we posit that a decrease in reward
ensitivity ensues during later adolescence and into young adult-
ood as the reward system becomes desensitized to the effects
f these hormones (Smith et al., 2013). While admittedly limited,
ecent evidence integrating measures of puberty into psycholog-
cal, behavioral, and neuroscience studies supports this claim as
ell.
.1. Sensation seeking
One psychological manifestation of socioemotional reactivity
s sensation seeking. As anticipated by the dual systems model,
easures of sensation seeking are often found to be predictive
f self-reported risk taking (e.g., Kong et al., 2013; MacPherson
t al., 2010). True sensation-seeking behavior is difﬁcult to elicit in
aboratory environments (at least, among human subjects); conse-
uently, the vast majority of studies examining age-related changes
n sensation seeking rely on self-report. As would be expected
ithin the dual systems account, longitudinal and cross-sectional
tudies generally ﬁnd evidence of a peak in self-reported sensation
eeking around mid-adolescence and a decrease into adulthood
Harden and Tucker-Drob, 2011; Peach and Gaultney, 2013; Quinn
nd Harden, 2013; Romer and Hennessy, 2007; Shulman et al.,
014a,b; Steinberg and Chein, 2015; Steinberg et al., 2008). This
verall pattern is further corroborated by a number of longitudi-
al studies following individuals from childhood into adolescence,
hich ﬁnd that sensation seeking increases across this time period
Collado et al., 2014; Lynne-Landsman et al., 2011; MacPherson
t al., 2010). For example, using the Brief Sensation-seeking Scale
Hoyle et al., 2002), Collado and colleagues (2014) found a linear
ncrease in sensation seeking in individuals aged 9–13. Fewer longi-
udinal studies of sensation seeking have followed individuals from
dolescence into adulthood. However, two recent studies using large, longitudinal data set (the National Longitudinal Study of
outh 1979 Child and Young Adult Survey) have helped to address
his gap and clarify the developmental pattern of sensation seek-
ng across adolescence. Harden and Tucker-Drob (2011) found thatve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117 107
self-reported sensation seeking increased from age 10 to mid-
adolescence, and then decreased thereafter into early adulthood.
Analyzing the same data set, Shulman and colleagues (2014a,b)
found that females demonstrated an earlier peak in sensation seek-
ing (age 16–17) than males (age 18–19), and a steeper decline
thereafter. Overall, these studies suggest that, as the dual systems
model would predict, sensation seeking follows an inverted-U pat-
tern over time, consistent with the proposed pattern of change in
the socioemotional system.
The hypothesis that pubertal development drives developmen-
tal change in the socioemotional system in adolescence is derived
in part from older studies linking higher levels of sensation seek-
ing to more advanced pubertal status (Martin et al., 2002; Resnick
et al., 1993). Newer studies have replicated this result (Castellanos-
Ryan et al., 2013; Gunn and Smith, 2010; Quevedo et al., 2009;
Urosˇevic´ et al., 2014) and have found evidence that the correla-
tion between self-reported pubertal development and sensation
seeking may  be stronger for boys than for girls (Castellanos-Ryan
et al., 2013; Steinberg et al., 2008). Also, as would be expected based
on the link between puberty and sensation seeking, recent studies
have found that more advanced pubertal status in adolescents is
associated with greater involvement in behaviors that are closely
related to sensation seeking, such as substance use (Castellanos-
Ryan et al., 2013; de Water et al., 2013; Gunn and Smith, 2010),
law-breaking (Collado et al., 2014; Kretschmer et al., 2014), and
risk taking in laboratory contexts (Collado et al., 2014; Kretsch and
Harden, 2014; Steinberg et al., 2008; but see van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2014 who  did not ﬁnd a correlation between pubertal status
and performance on a gambling task).
4.2. Behavioral manifestations of reward sensitivity
Compared to self-report studies of sensation seeking, there are
markedly fewer behavioral studies examining the development of
reward sensitivity, and these have heterogeneous methodologies
and ﬁndings, which makes it difﬁcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions
about age differences. One large-scale study utilized the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT; Cauffman et al., 2010) to explore age-related
changes in reward sensitivity. In the standard version of the IGT,
participants are presented with four decks of cards, two  that will
win them money over repeated play (advantageous decks) and two
that will lose them money over repeated play (disadvantageous
decks); participants are permitted to choose freely from the four
decks (e.g., Smith et al., 2011b). However, Cauffman et al. (2010)
modiﬁed the task such that the computer pseudorandomly selected
a deck on each trial and the participant was asked to decide whether
to play or pass. This modiﬁcation allowed the researchers to disen-
tangle afﬁnity for the advantageous decks—a measure of reward
sensitivity—from avoidance of disadvantageous decks. The results
indicated that mid-adolescents aged 14–17 and older adolescents
aged 18–21 learned to play from advantageous decks faster than
either younger adolescents (ages 10–13) or adults (ages 22–25),
a ﬁnding that was  recently replicated in an international sample
of more than 5000 individuals (Steinberg and Chein, 2015). This
outcome suggests that ages 14–21 are a period of heightened sen-
sitivity to reward. Using the same data set, Steinberg (2010) also
found that self-reported sensation seeking, but not impulsivity, was
associated with overall rate of plays from rewarding decks at the
end of the task.
Another way  researchers have examined developmental differ-
ences in reward sensitivity is by substituting neutral stimuli (e.g.,
letters) with rewarding ones (e.g., happy faces) in traditional behav-
ioral tasks (e.g., measures of impulse control), and then observing
the extent to which the presence of rewarding stimuli impacts
performance. Two  such studies have examined age differences
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n “Emotional Go/No-Go” task. In all Go/No-Go tasks, participants
re presented with a rapid sequence of target and non-target stim-
li, both of which are typically emotionally neutral. Participants are
nstructed to press a button when a target stimulus is presented
a “go” trial) and to withhold the button press (do nothing) when
 non-target stimulus is presented (a “no-go” trial). Non-target
vents occur relatively infrequently, making it challenging for par-
icipants to restrain the impulse to press the button on no-go trials.
As with most measures of self-regulation, performance improves
inearly with age on traditional Go/No-Go tasks (see Casey et al.,
002 for a review).]
In the Emotional Go/No-Go task employed by Somerville et al.
2011), the stimuli were photographs of either happy or calm faces.
hey found that for adolescents (ages 13–17) more than for chil-
ren (ages 6–12) or adults (ages 18–29), withholding a button press
as more difﬁcult when the no-go stimulus was a happy face—a
ewarding stimulus—than when it was a calm face. In fact, only
dolescents showed impaired impulse control in the happy, rela-
ive to the calm, no-go condition. The researchers proposed that
dolescents’ greater emotional response to the (rewarding) happy
ace made it harder for them to restrain the impulse to “approach” it
i.e., press the “go” button). If so, these results support the proposi-
ion that adolescents are particularly sensitive to reward. However,
nother study (Tottenham et al., 2011) using a similar, but not
dentical, Emotional Go/No-Go task did not ﬁnd this pattern (i.e.,
hey found no emotion by condition by age group interaction for
rroneous button presses). Though there were methodological dif-
erences between these two studies, the failure to ﬁnd the effect in
ne of the two underscores the need for further research in this
ein. It also highlights the beneﬁts of being able to incorporate
euroimaging methods. Engagement of the socioemotional system
ay  not always be robust enough (especially in laboratory settings)
o consistently bias behavior. Neuroimaging enables researchers
o detect age differences in the engagement of this system, even
bsent behavioral consequences.
.3. Neuroimaging of reward sensitivity
In recent years, many neuroimaging studies have asked whether
dolescents are particularly sensitive to reward. Beyond iden-
ifying differences between adolescents and other age groups,
hese studies help address questions about the neural mechanisms
nderlying adolescents’ heightened reward-seeking. For example,
mong those who agree that adolescents are more inclined than
dults to seek out rewards, there has been disagreement over
hether this results from the fact that rewards are experienced
s exceedingly pleasurable during adolescence (and are therefore
ore enticing) or because they are experienced as less so (and are
herefore less satisfying). Indeed, one early notion, now largely dis-
redited, posited that adolescents suffer from a “reward deﬁciency
yndrome” which impels them to seek out exciting experiences
ecause mundane ones are not sufﬁciently rewarding, much like
ddicts who seek out drugs because quotidian experiences no
onger excite them (for a discussion, see Spear, 2002).
To date, most of the developmental neuroscience literature has
ocused on developmental differences in the striatum, and more
peciﬁcally in the ventral portion of the striatum, which is con-
idered one of the main regions involved in the calculation of
eward (Knutson et al., 2001; Luciana and Collins, 2012). In our
ual systems account, increases in risk taking and other reward-
eeking behaviors are thought to be a consequence of increased
ngagement of the striatum during decision-making, thus biasing
dolescents toward more rewarding choices. Heightened sensitiv-
ty to rewarding outcomes of prior decisions may  contribute to
dolescent risk-taking as well. There is evidence, for example, that
he volume of the nucleus accumbens (part of the ventral striatumve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
and presumed to be the central structure in the reward system)
increases during the ﬁrst part of adolescence and then shrinks
thereafter (Luciana and Collins, 2012).
As discussed by Steinberg (2008), the neuroscience literature
includes both studies that support and challenge the dual systems
account of heightened striatal engagement during adolescence
(e.g., Bjork et al., 2004; Galvan et al., 2006). Since that 2008 publi-
cation, several reviews have discussed methodological differences
across these studies that may  have contributed to the inconsistent
ﬁndings (see Galvan, 2010; Richards et al., 2013). Indeed, the devel-
opmental neuroimaging literature on reward processing has grown
substantially over the last several years, and we  believe there are
patterns to be noted, and conclusions to be drawn, that help explain
what appear to be contradictory ﬁndings.
In its current state, the literature provides considerable evi-
dence that when developmental differences in striatal activation
are present during reward processing (both during the anticipa-
tion and the receipt of reward) adolescents engage the striatum to
a greater extent than both children and adults (Barkley-Levenson
and Galvan, 2014; Christakou et al., 2011; Galvan and McGlennen,
2013; Galvan et al., 2006; Geier et al., 2010; Hoogendam et al., 2013;
Jarcho et al., 2012; Padmanabhan et al., 2011; Silverman et al., 2015;
Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b). For example, a recent longitudinal
study found that, across mid-adolescence (roughly ages 15–18),
ventral striatal activation in response to “risk taking” on the bal-
loon analogue task (which also reﬂects reward-seeking) declines
intra-individually over time, and that striatal activation during the
task is correlated with self-reported risk taking outside the lab-
oratory (Qu et al., 2015). However, a handful of studies ﬁnd the
opposite pattern—dampened striatal response during adolescence
relative to adulthood (Bjork et al., 2004, 2010; Hoogendam et al.,
2013; Lamm et al., 2014)—and others fail to demonstrate any age
differences (Krain et al., 2006; Teslovich et al., 2014; Van Leijenhorst
et al., 2006).
In trying to explain this inconsistency, it is important to note
that disparate ﬁndings emerge only for contrasts that focus on the
anticipation of a reward. Studies focusing on striatal engagement
during the receipt of a reward consistently ﬁnd that adolescents
engage the striatum to a greater extent than adults (Galvan and
McGlennen, 2013; Hoogendam et al., 2013; Van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010b), suggesting that adolescents are—as the dual systems model
claims—more sensitive to rewarding outcomes.
The fact that striatal engagement is relatively higher among ado-
lescents than among children or adults during receipt of rewards
but not necessarily during reward anticipation potentially chal-
lenges our conception of adolescent risk taking as being driven
by the prospect of a reward. However, nuances in task design,
modeling of the anticipatory event in imaging analyses, and the
relationship between striatal engagement and behavioral reward
sensitivity may  account for these seemingly inconsistent results,
for several reasons. First, the time points at which events are mod-
eled, and the speciﬁc trial periods that are included within the
model, can dramatically affect the observed neural response (e.g.,
Geier et al., 2010). One factor that seems to differentiate studies
that do and don’t report increased adolescent engagement of the
striatum during reward anticipation is the degree to which antic-
ipatory cues reliably predict the delivery of the reward. Studies
using a task design in which the reward cue signals not only the
opportunity for reward, but also an increased likelihood of earning
that reward, tend to ﬁnd increased adolescent activity in the stria-
tum during anticipation (e.g., Barkley-Levenson and Galvan, 2014;
Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b). Meanwhile, studies using tasks for
which the anticipatory cue signals the possibility to earn a reward,
but is equivocal with respect to the likelihood of succeeding in
obtaining the reward (as in typical implementations of the Mon-
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evelopmental differences (e.g., Bjork et al., 2007; Teslovich et al.,
014).
Second, developmental ﬁndings regarding striatal outputs dur-
ng reward anticipation are more consistent in studies where there
s also concomitant behavioral evidence that the adolescents are
elatively more sensitive to the rewards being presented (e.g., faster
eaction times on rewarded trials, more reward-related errors, etc.).
hile most reward processing tasks used in neuroimaging stud-
es do not include a behavioral measure or control for behavioral
ifferences in reward sensitivity across development, the handful
f studies that do (Barkley-Levenson and Galvan, 2014; Christakou
t al., 2011; Geier et al., 2010; Padmanabhan et al., 2011; Somerville
t al., 2011) all report both greater recruitment of the striatum dur-
ng anticipation of reward and higher reward sensitivity among
dolescents compared to adults, reﬂected in the behavioral out-
omes. Unfortunately, the majority of reward tasks used in the
evelopmental literature lack a useful behavioral index of reward
ensitivity—an issue that may  also account for variability in striatal
ndings across development.
Our lab recently explored how socioemotional arousal inﬂu-
nces adolescents’ neural responses to reward by testing whether
he presence of peers increased striatal activation during a reward-
rocessing task in which no risk was involved (Smith et al., 2015).
n this study, we examined the effects of peer observation on ado-
escents’ and adults’ neural response to reward using a modiﬁed
ersion of the High/Low Card Guessing Task (Delgado et al., 2003;
ay  et al., 2004). During the receipt of reward, adolescents who
ompleted the task in the presence of their peers recruited the stria-
um to a greater degree than when they completed the task alone.
urthermore, only when peers were present did adolescents evince
reater striatal activation than adults. These ﬁndings provide cor-
oborating evidence that, during adolescence, social context is an
mportant modulator of reward processing, even when this pro-
essing is uncoupled from risk taking. Consistent with this claim,
e have shown that, in the presence of peers, adolescents evince a
tronger preference for immediate (as opposed to delayed) rewards
n a Delay Discounting task that does not involve risk taking
O’Brien et al., 2011; Weigard et al., 2014).
Recent neuroimaging studies also support the idea that, in addi-
ion to having profound effects on brain structure [a topic not
overed in the present article; see Blakemore et al. (2010) and
mith et al. (2013) for reviews], pubertal development plays a role
n developmental change in the sensitivity of the striatum to reward
Braams et al., 2015; Forbes et al., 2010; Op de Macks et al., 2011).
or example, a landmark, longitudinal neuroimaging study of chil-
ren, adolescents and young adults (N = 299, ages 8–27) found, as
revious studies have, that activation of the nucleus accumbens
n response to monetary reward (relative to loss) was higher in
id-adolescence than at other ages (Braams et al., 2015). Moreover,
ctivation of this region was related both to greater self-reported
ubertal stage and higher levels of salivary testosterone (Braams
t al., 2015). This ﬁnding provides strong support for the claim that
he heightened responsiveness of the socioemotional system dur-
ng adolescence is, at least in part, a result of pubertal development.
Thus far, we have discussed reward sensitivity speciﬁcally
ith respect to striatal activation. However, there also have
een advances in how we understand developmental changes
n the functioning of other regions hypothesized to participate
n reward processing, including the dorsal portion of the stria-
um (Benningﬁeld et al., 2014; Hoogendam et al., 2013; Lamm
t al., 2014), mPFC (Christakou et al., 2011), OFC (Galvan et al.,
006; Galvan and McGlennen, 2013; Hoogendam et al., 2013; Van
eijenhorst et al., 2010b), and the anterior insular cortex (AIC)
Galvan and McGlennen, 2013; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b).
In a recent paper, we  posited that continuing maturation of con-
ectivity between the striatum and the AIC, which appears to actve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117 109
as connective hub that inﬂuences the engagement of both the con-
trol and reward processing networks, may  account for inconsistent
recruitment of the striatum in adolescent reward processing (Smith
et al., 2014b). Because reward processing entails the coordinated
action of a network of regions, developmental studies examining
the reward system as a whole, rather than focusing on activa-
tion of speciﬁc regions considered in isolation, will likely yield
greater insight into changes in reward processing during adoles-
cence, including the reasons for the inconsistent recruitment of the
striatum in adolescent reward processing (Smith et al., 2014b).
One study has already demonstrated the potential value of
such a network-based approach. Using resting state data, Cho and
colleagues (2012) examined functional connectivity between the
striatum, thalamus, and AIC as adolescents and adults completed
a reward processing task. They found that during anticipation of
reward (i.e., during cue presentation) adolescents and adults did
not differ in the functional connectivity between these regions. Fur-
ther, they observed that activity in the AIC and thalamus preceded
VS activation in both adolescents and adults. These results sug-
gest that the bottom-up processing of rewards (as demonstrated by
communication between these three regions) is adequately devel-
oped by adolescence. Therefore, it may  be that developmental
differences between adolescents and adults in reward sensitivity
are not due to immature connectivity, but rather to differences
in top-down inﬂuences on the subjective valuation of reward.
More studies considering the socioemotional system as a coordi-
nated network are needed to inform our understanding of how the
development of this system relates to age-differences in reward
processing.
In summary, despite occasional inconsistencies in the literature,
self-reported sensation seeking, behavioral measures of reward
sensitivity, and neuroimaging studies of reward processing sup-
port the contention that reward sensitivity reaches its apex during
adolescence (e.g., Barkley-Levenson and Galvan, 2014; Christakou
et al., 2011; Collado et al., 2014; Galvan and McGlennen, 2013;
MacPherson et al., 2010; Shulman et al., 2014a,b; Somerville et al.,
2011; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b). The bulk of developmen-
tal research on this topic provides evidence for a mid-adolescent
peak in reward sensitivity, and although the neuroimaging litera-
ture does not allow for a precise estimation of age of peak striatal
response, the weight of the evidence indicates that adolescents
engage the striatum (and other components of the reward net-
work) to a greater extent than adults, particularly during receipt
of reward and when differences in reward sensitivity are reﬂected
in decision-making behavior. Also consistent with the dual systems
account, studies that have incorporated measures of puberty typi-
cally ﬁnd that sensation seeking and reward sensitivity are higher
among those (particularly boys) who are more pubertally advanced.
5. The development of self-regulation and cognitive control
5.1. Self-reported impulsivity
A second major claim of the dual systems model is that cognitive
control increases linearly across adolescence and does not reach
full maturity until several years after the peak period of reward
sensitivity. In the developmental literature, impulse control (or its
inverse, impulsivity) is the psychological variable most often used
to assess self-regulation (or its absence). Impulsiveness—acting
in an unplanned and reactive, or less thought out, fashion—is
often considered a quintessential adolescent characteristic that
predisposes adolescents to engage in reckless behaviors (Romer,
2010). To date, studies examining age differences in self-reported
impulsivity—both cross-sectional (Leshem and Glicksohn, 2007;
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011)—ﬁnd that impulsivity decreases with age across the second
ecade of life.
Importantly, the protracted maturation of impulse control is
elieved to continue into young adulthood, where even 18–19 year
lds report higher impulsivity (i.e., less impulse control) than indi-
iduals in their early twenties (Vaidya et al., 2010). Although adults
ometimes engage in impulsive acts, by the early-to-mid 20s the
requency of impulsive behavior appears to stabilize at levels much
ower than those exhibited by adolescents (Steinberg et al., 2008;
uinn and Harden, 2013). For example, using a three-item impul-
ivity scale, Quinn and Harden (2013) found a linear decrease in
elf-reported impulsivity between the ages of 15 and 21, but no
urther age differences among individuals between 21 and 25.
.2. Behavioral measures of self-regulation
Self-regulation is commonly assessed in behavioral tasks that
equire response inhibition, a form of cognitive control that
nvolves overcoming automatic or inappropriate responses in favor
f goal-relevant information processing and actions (Casey et al.,
002). The most widely used measures of response inhibition
e.g., Go/NoGo, antisaccade, and Stroop paradigms) are typically
onﬁgured to assess “reactive inhibition,” which refers to the out-
ight restraint of motor and perceptual impulses in response to
n external stimulus (e.g., canceling a prepotent response upon
eeing a signal, or maintaining attention in the presence of dis-
ractions). A wealth of behavioral evidence on reactive inhibitory
ontrol demonstrates that self-regulation improves from childhood
o adulthood (Bezdjian et al., 2014; Bunge et al., 2002; Casey et al.,
997, 2002; Durston et al., 2002; Marsh et al., 2006; Paulsen et al.,
015; Rubia et al., 2006, 2013; Smith et al., 2011a; Tamm et al.,
002; Velanova et al., 2009; Veroude et al., 2013).
Within this literature, adolescents and adults consistently
emonstrate better inhibitory control compared to children;
owever, differences between adolescents and adults are not con-
istently found unless the behavioral paradigm is particularly
hallenging. For example, studies that use the traditional Stroop
olor-word task ﬁnd no differences in cognitive control between
dolescents and adults (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011), whereas
tudies that use an emotional version of the Stroop to assess
he effect of emotional interference in cognitive control report
mprovements in self-regulation from adolescence to adulthood
e.g., Veroude et al., 2013). Thus, while adolescents’ ability to inhibit
mpulses appears to be comparable to adults’ in relatively simple
asks, the sort of self-regulatory skills necessary to appropriately
espond to more cognitively demanding situations continue to
mprove from adolescence to adulthood. This developmental pat-
ern is also observed in measures of proactive (as opposed to
eactive) inhibitory control, which involves advance planning and
onitoring in anticipation of the need to stop a response or to
ot engage in a future action (e.g., slowing down responses to
o-stimuli in anticipation of a no-go signal approaching, therefore
llowing more time to appropriately cancel a response when the
o-go signal appears; Vink et al., 2014). These ﬁndings suggest
hat while basic response inhibition mechanisms may  be mature
y adolescence, self-regulatory mechanisms underlying challeng-
ng reactive response inhibition tasks and proactive response
nhibition (e.g., planning) may  still be developing into the early
0s.
The proposition that the prolonged development of self-
egulation is more evident under challenging conditions has been
emonstrated using the Tower of London task. In this task, which
equires strategic planning, participants must rearrange objects on
egs (either real or depicted on a computer monitor) to produce
 speciﬁc pattern in the fewest possible moves (De Luca et al.,
003; Steinberg et al., 2008). Researchers manipulate the difﬁcultyve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
of trials by increasing the number of moves required to complete
the rearrangement successfully. The amount of time a participant
spends deliberating before making his or her ﬁrst move (latency
to ﬁrst move) is used as a measure of impulse control (because
making an initial move too rashly can extend the number of moves
needed to solve the problem). A study from our lab found no dif-
ferences between children, adolescents, and adults in latency to
ﬁrst move or in the number of moves taken to complete the trial
on easy trials (i.e., those that can be solved in 3 moves) (Albert
and Steinberg, 2011). However, on difﬁcult trials (i.e., those that
required 5 or more moves to be solved), performance improved
with age from childhood to adulthood, and this trend coincided
with greater deliberation time prior to the initial move. These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that when difﬁcult tasks are used, such as those that
require strategic planning, improvement in self-regulation contin-
ues throughout adolescence and into the early 20s, consistent with
the dual systems model.
Importantly, the ongoing development of self-regulation into
early adulthood is also in line with the idea that the develop-
ment of self-regulation is independent of pubertal development
(Smith et al., 2013). In the most comprehensive test of the rela-
tionship between self-regulation, and pubertal status Steinberg
and colleagues (2008) found that self-reported and behavioral self-
regulation was  correlated with age but not pubertal status. Instead,
pubertal status was  more closely tied to sensation seeking. While
this is the only study we  know of that simultaneously examines
the relationship between age, pubertal status, self-regulation, and
sensation seeking, thus far the ﬁndings support the notion that the
development of the socioemotional system is dependent on puber-
tal status while self-regulation seems to develop independently.
Other ﬁndings suggest that adolescents’ ability to exert adult-
like self-control also may  vary depending on whether rewards are
offered for better performance (Luna et al., 2001). In several stud-
ies that have rewarded participants for better performance on an
antisaccade task, researchers have found that incentives boost ado-
lescents’ performance to adult levels (Geier et al., 2010; Jazbec et al.,
2006; Padmanabhan et al., 2011). For example, using an antisac-
cade task where some trials were rewarded and some were not,
Geier and colleagues (2010) found that adolescents performed bet-
ter on rewarded trials, compared to non-rewarded trials, though
their overall task performance did not differ from that of adults.
At ﬁrst blush, it may  appear that these results are incompatible
with the dual systems model, since its basic claim is that height-
ened awareness of the availability of rewards should undermine
cognitive control in adolescents, not strengthen it. It is important
to note, though, that this proposition of the dual systems model
is posited speciﬁcally with respect to situations in which reward-
seeking impulses conﬂict with self-regulatory efforts, as do most
instances of risk taking. In contexts where increased sensitivity
to the opportunity for reward serves to motivate faster and more
attentive responding, without disturbing relevant cognitive pro-
cesses, adolescents’ relatively heightened sensitivity to reward may
be helpful rather than harmful. For that matter, even in certain risk-
taking scenarios—in particular, those in which increased risk taking
results in more optimal performance, such as in certain gambling
tasks for which risky choices have a higher expected value—greater
reward sensitivity can offer an advantage.
Overall, the self-report and behavioral literatures on self-
regulation suggest that this capacity improves with age across
childhood, adolescence, and into adulthood. Furthermore, it may
be that adolescents’ ability to self-regulate is more dependent than
adults’ on contextual factors, such as task difﬁculty, the prospect
of a reward for better self-control, and the manner in which
rewards are presented. Although adolescents may  exhibit adult-
like self-regulation under ideal circumstances by around age 15,
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e best indexed by the consistency with which individuals demon-
trate self-control across different contextual circumstances.
As we have noted previously (Strang et al., 2013), it is imprudent
o conclude that heightened reward sensitivity is inherently disad-
antageous, or that impulsivity is always problematic. In situations
n which greater attentiveness to reward or more impetuous behav-
or is desirable, adolescents may  enjoy a distinct advantage over
dults. Indeed, one of the tenets of the dual systems model is that
dolescence evolved as a period during which individuals are more
ikely to engage in sensation seeking and less likely to restrain urges
o pursue immediate rewards because this combination may  con-
er a reproductive advantage during a period of heightened fertility
Steinberg, 2014).
.3. Neuroimaging of cognitive control
In recent years, developmental neuroimaging has helped eluci-
ate the neural mechanisms underlying age-related improvements
n cognitive control. Continuing maturation of response inhibition
s often examined in terms of development of the prefrontal cor-
ex, and particularly the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). In line
ith the dual systems framework, we postulate that develop-
ental improvements in cognitive control are supported by the
oncurrent maturation of these underlying neural regions and by
nhancements in top-down connectivity between frontal cognitive
ontrol regions and other cortical and subcortical areas associated
ith motor processing, affective processing, and the execution of
elected actions.
Irrespective of age, individuals who perform better on response
nhibition tasks (i.e., Go/No-Go, Flanker, Stroop, Stop Signal, anti-
accade) exhibit greater activation of the lPFC compared to those
ho perform poorly (Durston et al., 2006; Rubia et al., 2006,
013; Velanova et al., 2009). Across adolescence, performance
n response inhibition tasks improves with age—a pattern that
ppears to be explained by continuing maturation of the lPFC, with
ost studies ﬁnding either a linear increase in lPFC recruitment
ith age (Adleman et al., 2002; Bunge et al., 2002; Durston et al.,
006; Marsh et al., 2006; Paulsen et al., 2015; Spielberg et al., 2015;
amm et al., 2002; Velanova et al., 2009; Vink et al., 2014) or sig-
iﬁcantly increased engagement of the lPFC from adolescence to
dulthood (Rubia et al., 2000, 2006, 2013; Veroude et al., 2013). Fur-
hermore, several studies have demonstrated a direct relationship
etween age-related increases in lPFC engagement and success-
ul cognitive control (Adleman et al., 2002; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
011; Bunge et al., 2002; Casey et al., 1997; Durston et al., 2006;
ubia et al., 2006, 2007, 2013; Velanova et al., 2009).
Whereas the behavioral and neuroimaging literatures gener-
lly indicate a relationship between increases in cognitive control
nd engagement of the lPFC from adolescence into adulthood, the
elationship between age, behavior, and neural engagement from
hildhood to adolescence is not as consistent (Alahyane et al., 2014;
ooth et al., 2003; Braet et al., 2009; Casey et al., 1997; Durston
t al., 2002). In fact, some studies ﬁnd that children utilize more
rontal regions than adults—in terms of overall volume and/or mag-
itude of activity—in order to successfully withhold a prepotent
ction. These ﬁndings have led researchers to posit that increases
n self-regulation from childhood to adolescence and into adult-
ood may  be due to a developmental progression from diffuse to
ocal activation (Durston et al., 2002). In this account, during child-
ood and early adolescence, the brain is inefﬁcient and needs to
work harder,” recruiting neurons across a larger frontal area in
rder to successfully inhibit a response (though see Poldrack, 2014
or a critique of the explanatory value of the term “efﬁciency” in this
ontext). As the brain undergoes continued reorganization across
dolescence, necessary neural connections are strengthened and
nnecessary ones are pruned, creating a more efﬁcient brain andve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117 111
leading to more focal recruitment of regions within the lPFC during
successful inhibition.
Cognitive control encompasses the integration of several (often
simultaneous) processes that support planning behavior in accord
with one’s intentions (Miller, 2000). The effective integration of
these processes relies not only on the functional recruitment of
implicated brain regions, but also on the strength of connectiv-
ity among them (Hwang et al., 2010; van Belle et al., 2014). For
example, a study by Hwang and colleagues (2010) examined devel-
opmental changes in connectivity underlying inhibitory control
and found that connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and
other cortical areas increased from childhood into adolescence,
with some connections continuing to strengthen from adoles-
cence to adulthood. The increases they observed in the number
and strength of frontal connections to both cortical and subcorti-
cal regions during the transition from adolescence into adulthood
suggest that developmental improvements in cognitive control
may  be supported by age related enhancements in the top-down
regulation of task-engaged regions. Results such as these under-
score the potential beneﬁt to the ﬁeld of fMRI studies moving
beyond simplistic models of regional activation toward more elab-
orate models that consider connectivity among regions throughout
development, as well as the strength and efﬁciency of those
connections, which likely support age-related increases in the
acquisition and execution of complex cognitive control skills (see,
e.g., Satterthwaite et al., 2013). This is particularly true because, as
noted earlier, there is reason to believe that continuing changes in
connectivity account for the observation that some aspects of cog-
nitive control continue to strengthen into early adulthood, instead
of plateauing in adolescence.
6. Is risk taking during adolescence related to heightened
reward sensitivity and immature cognitive control?
As reviewed above, research largely supports the dual systems
model’s characterization of adolescence as a time of heightened
socioemotional reactivity (relative to earlier and later periods) and
still maturing cognitive control. Moreover, there is considerable
evidence consistent with the proposition that the developmen-
tal trajectories of reward sensitivity and cognitive control (and,
by extension, sensation seeking and self-regulation) differ, with
the former following an inverted U-shaped pattern and the latter
evincing protracted, linear improvement that extends into the third
decade of life.
How well does the literature support the claim that devel-
opmental change in these two systems explains heightened risk
taking during adolescence? The model posits that it is the con-
ﬂuence of the developmental patterns of the socioemotional
and cognitive control systems—relatively high responsiveness to
reward combined with relatively weak self-regulation—that ren-
ders adolescents particularly vulnerable to risk taking. If the two
systems contribute to risk taking in an additive manner, we should
ﬁnd independent correlations between the functional state of each
system and risk-taking propensity. Indeed, there is evidence for this
pattern in the literature.
In order to serve as a test of the dual systems model in predict-
ing risk taking, a behavioral study must include measures of both
socioemotional reactivity and cognitive control. Unfortunately,
constructs reﬂecting the functional status of the socioemotional
and cognitive control systems, like sensation seeking and impulsiv-
ity, tend to be highly correlated (e.g., Shulman and Cauffman, 2014;
Steinberg et al., 2008), despite being theoretically and empirically
separable (Duckworth and Kern, 2011; Duckworth and Steinberg,
2015). Thus, for studies that examine the relationship between
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e contaminated by the contribution of the unmeasured construct.
ome of this overlap between sensation seeking and self-regulation
ay  be artifactual—a result of the difﬁculty of developing mea-
ures that cleanly assess one construct and not the other. (For
xample, items like “I often get myself into trouble” could reﬂect
ither sensation seeking or impulsivity.) But some of the observed
ssociation between these constructs may  be attributable to an
ngoing dynamic interplay between the socioemotional and cogni-
ive control systems; for example, when the socioemotional system
enerates an impulse to pursue an intrinsically rewarding expe-
ience and the cognitive control system counters with a signal
eant to restrain the impulse. Although a large number of stud-
es have examined risky behavior in relation to measures of either
ensation seeking or impulse control, very few have examined the
oncurrent contributions to risk taking of psychological manifesta-
ions of socioemotional activation and cognitive control. Even fewer
ave examined this question in a sample spanning childhood, ado-
escence, and adulthood, which would be necessary to fully test
hether variation in the functional status of these two  systems
xplains age-related patterns in risk taking.
In the few studies that have simultaneously assessed constructs
eﬂective of the socioemotional and cognitive control systems (e.g.,
ensation seeking and impulse control) along with measures of risk
aking, the anticipated correlations are found. Both higher levels
f sensation seeking and lower levels of impulse control explain
ariation in risk taking, over and above the effects of one another
Cyders et al., 2009; Donohew et al., 2000; Quinn and Harden, 2013).
or example, one study of college students found that sensation
eeking uniquely predicted increases in the frequency of alcohol
se, over and above several measures of impulsivity (Cyders et al.,
009). Another found that both sensation seeking and “impulsive
ecision making” were independently associated with greater odds
f ninth-graders engaging in sex, non-coital sexual behavior, alco-
ol use, and marijuana use (Donohew et al., 2000). Moreover, these
ssociations were comparable in magnitude, except that impulsive
ecision-making was more strongly associated with having sex and
ensation seeking was more strongly associated with marijuana
se. Similarly, unpublished data from our lab—based on a sample of
83 10–30-year olds and using a scale that surveyed involvement in
 wide range of risk-taking behaviors (see Shulman and Cauffman,
014)—suggests that impulse control and sensation seeking con-
ribute equally (betas = −.21 and .21, respectively) to self-reported
ngagement in risky behaviors (controlling for age, sex, and each
ther). An obvious shortcoming of these studies is that they rely
xclusively on self-report. However, if common method variance
lone were driving the ﬁndings, one would not expect to see inde-
endent relations between risk taking and either sensation seeking
r impulsivity once the other predictor was controlled. Another
imitation of these studies is that it is not yet clear how well self-
eport measures reﬂect the functional status of the socioemotional
nd cognitive control systems.
Neuroimaging studies have the advantage over behavioral
tudies of being able to measure activation within distinguishable
egions thought to correspond to the socioemotional and cognitive
ontrol systems (although heightened activity in these regions
uring a laboratory task does not constitute a direct measure of the
unctional status of these systems). A few studies have examined
ngagement of regions associated with the socioemotional and/or
ognitive control systems during adolescent decision making (e.g.,
ascio et al., 2015; Kahn et al., 2015; Paulsen et al., 2011; van
uijvenvoorde et al., 2015b). However, only Chein et al. (2011)
ound increased engagement of structures within the socioemo-
ional system and decreased activation of structures within the
ognitive control system simultaneously within a risk-taking task
a driving simulation). One additional study (Paulsen et al., 2011)
ound age effects in both the PFC and striatum during risk taking.ve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
During risky (i.e., varying expected values) compared to sure
(i.e., guaranteed reward) decisions, several PFC regions showed
increased activation with age, consistent with Chein et al. (2011).
On the other hand, striatal activation was inconsistent, making
these results difﬁcult to interpret.
Another recent study examined the extent to which age differ-
ences in impatience during a temporal discounting task—in which
participants choose between a smaller immediate reward and a
larger delayed reward—are explained by variations in self-reported
“present hedonism” (i.e., reward sensitivity) and “future orien-
tation” (i.e., impulse control) and engagement of neural regions
and networks during decision making (van den Bos et al., 2015).
Though the decision making task did not involve risk, the study
is nonetheless relevant to the dual systems model because it was
designed to probe the degree to which adolescents’ tendency to
discount the future is due to greater reward sensitivity or weaker
self control. The results indicated that choices to delay gratiﬁca-
tion in the decision task were associated with greater self-reported
future orientation and increased engagement of frontoparietal con-
trol circuitry, but not with variation in self reported hedonism.
Also, improvements in frontostriatal connectivity mediated the
link between age and willingness to wait for a larger reward. The
authors interpreted these results as showing that weak cognitive
control, rather than heightened reward sensitivity, explains ado-
lescents’ tendency to discount the future. However, limitations of
the methodology (e.g., limited range on the present hedonism scale,
lumping immediate rewards together with rewards to be received
in two  weeks for analysis of the discounting data, and the unemo-
tional context of the laboratory) may  have biased the study against
ﬁnding linkages between reward sensitivity and impatience (see
Steinberg and Chein, 2015).
Whereas other studies have not demonstrated simultaneously
heightened socioemotional activation and dampened cognitive
control within the same task, a few recent ones have observed
heightened striatal activation when adolescents receive a reward
following a decision (Braams et al., 2014, 2015). In one further
relevant study (Cascio et al., 2015), researchers recruited recently
licensed drivers (∼age 16) to complete a response inhibition task
and, one week later, a driving simulation in the presence of a peer
confederate. The peer either encouraged risky driving or safe driv-
ing. In the latter condition (encouragement of safe driving), greater
engagement of cognitive control circuitry (i.e., IFG and BG) during
the response inhibition task (indicative of better cognitive control)
predicted safer driving behavior in the simulated driving task. Par-
ticipants who exhibited higher cognitive control also showed no
increase in risky driving in the condition in which the peer encour-
aged risk taking, suggesting that individuals who evince greater
engagement of cognitive control circuitry may be more resistant
socioemotional arousal. These ﬁndings indicate that poor cogni-
tive control, as expected, also plays a role in risk-taking behavior.
However, because the study did not compare age groups, it cannot
address whether maturation of cognitive control helps to account
for developmental patterns in risk taking.
In another recent study, van Duijvenvoorde and colleagues
(2015b) had children, adolescents, and adults complete a risk-
taking task (Columbia Card Task). While overall risk-taking
tendency did not differ by age, adolescents showed greater acti-
vation of control circuitry (including the dmPFC) as the riskiness
of the decision increased. This effect was  not seen in children or
adults. The authors suggest that heightened recruitment of control
circuitry was necessary due to the heightened emotional response
to risk during this age. Although there is good reason to believe
that the functional status of both the socioemotional and cognitive
control systems during adolescence contribute to heightened risk
taking during this stage of development, the dual systems model
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he purported joint effects of the developmental trajectories of
he socioemotional and cognitive control systems on risk-taking
ehavior.
. Unresolved questions and future directions
There are many unresolved issues in the literature that await
urther research attention. Here we highlight just a few of them.
irst, because of differences in opportunity to engage in risky
ehavior outside the laboratory environment, the effects of matura-
ion of the socioemotional system and cognitive control system on
eal-world risk taking are likely to be modest and difﬁcult to detect.
ndoubtedly, contextual constraints on the behavior of adolescents
elative to adults overwhelm any putative effect on actual risk tak-
ng. To take an obvious example, even if 15-year-olds are higher
n sensation seeking and lower in self-regulation than people in
heir 20s, these differences will not be reﬂected in age differences
n reckless driving in a country where 15-year-olds are not per-
itted to drive. Thus, tests of the dual systems model will require
he continued development of laboratory tasks that are ecologically
alid but that afford individuals of different ages equal opportu-
ity to take risks. Future efforts to test the dual systems model’s
laims also would beneﬁt from collaboration between behavioral
esearchers and neuroscientists to develop measures that more
recisely reﬂect the functioning of the neural systems underlying
he socioemotional and cognitive control systems.
Second, still unresolved is the question of why the socioemo-
ional system declines in responsiveness between adolescence and
dulthood. Luciana and Collins (2012) have speculated that experi-
nce with rewards and learning lead to lower background levels
f dopamine, a proposition that has not yet been tested. Casey
t al.’s (2008) model implies that decreases in risk taking after the
aturation of the socioemotional system, which in their view is
omplete by mid-adolescence, are ultimately attributable to the
ontinued strengthening of the cognitive control system. Given the
vidence of reduced reward responsiveness in the key node of the
ocioemotional system in adulthood (relative to adolescence), it
ould seem that their version of the model suggests that strength-
ning of the cognitive control system prospectively dampens the
eactivity of the socioemotional system. One study from our lab
as tested this hypothesis: Shulman et al. (2014b) examined the
ffects of self-reported impulse control (a reﬂection of the cog-
itive control system) and sensation seeking (a reﬂection of the
ocioemotional system) on one another over time in a large sample
f youth, ages 10–25, who were assessed biennially as part of the
LSY79 Children and Young Adults Study. The analysis failed to ﬁnd
vidence that increases in impulse control prospectively predict
ecreases in sensation seeking; in general, these two traits devel-
ped independently. Recently, a neuroimaging study using intrinsic
onnectivity found that increases in dlPFC-subcortical (thalamus
nd striatum when not controlling for age2) connectivity across
dolescence were associated with increases in cognitive control but
ot with decreases in reward sensitivity (van Duijvenvoorde et al.,
015a). Instead, decreases in reward sensitivity were related to age-
elated decreases in connectivity within the socioemotional system
vmPFC, OFC, and striatum). Together these ﬁndings lend support
o the notion that these traits develop independently. However,
urther investigation of this question is warranted; in particular,
ongitudinal studies employing more closely spaced measures and
ore sensitive assessments of the functional states of the socioe-
otional and cognitive control systems are needed.
2 When the analysis controls for age this relationship is not signiﬁcant. As the
uthors suggest this relationship may  be more sensitive to age than their measure
f  cognitive control.ve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117 113
A third issue concerns the operationalization of mature cog-
nitive control. It is clear that in some respects, key nodes of the
cognitive control system have reached adult levels of structural and
functional maturation by mid-adolescence, a point made recently
by Luna et al. (2014). Yet there are other signs that aspects of cog-
nitive control are immature, unreliable, or easily disrupted during
mid-adolescence relative to adulthood, which challenges Luna and
Wright’s (2016) notion that cognitive control is mature by mid-
adolescence. Part of this inconsistency stems, we believe, from
heterogeneous operationalizations of “mature” cognitive control.
It is now eminently clear that whether activation of this system
is weaker or stronger is not a useful way of conceptualizing the
maturity of the cognitive control system, because on some tasks
adolescents show greater or wider activation than adults, whereas
on others the reverse is true. As we have argued (Strang et al., 2013),
a more sensible index of maturation of cognitive control would
focus on structural and functional connectivity within the cognitive
control network and between this system and other brain regions
(DeWitt et al., 2014; Jacobus et al., 2013). In order to pursue this idea
further, research is needed that correlates psychological and behav-
ioral measures of self-regulation with indices of structural and
functional connectivity that involve the cognitive control system.
Recent connectivity analyses have demonstrated that increases
in control behaviors across adolescence are associated with an
increase in connectivity between striatal and prefrontal regions
(van den Bos et al., 2015; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015a; Vink
et al., 2014). However, some studies have also found that same-
aged individuals with more well-developed connections between
cortical and subcortical areas engage in relatively more risk taking
(Berns et al., 2009; DeWitt et al., 2014). This apparent inconsis-
tency between studies of development and studies of individual
differences among same-aged adolescents warrants further study.
Finally, it will almost certainly be necessary to consider the
development of, and interactions among, brain systems that are not
included in the dual systems model in order to account for the full
array of evidence on the development of risky behavior across the
period from preadolescence into adulthood. Such expansion of the
model is consistent with the triadic model (Ernst, 2014) and with
our recent efforts to consider how development in other pathways,
including those linking the AIC to the cognitive control and reward
systems (Smith et al., 2014b), may  impact risk-taking behavior.
According to our recent work, the transition between adolescence
and adulthood may involve a shift in the ways in which the VS, PFC,
and AIC are functionally connected, with relatively the stronger
connections between the insula and striatum characteristic of ado-
lescence giving way to stronger connections between the PFC and
insula in adulthood.
8. Concluding comment
The dual systems model attributes elevated levels of risk tak-
ing in adolescence to the heightened arousal of the socioemotional
system before the cognitive control system fully attains functional
maturity. Moreover, the decrease in risky behavior between adoles-
cence and adulthood is attributed to the continued strengthening of
the cognitive control system and the attenuation of arousal within
the socioemotional system. Whether and in what respects the
contributions of these changes in the cognitive control and socioe-
motional systems are independent, interactive, or reciprocal—or
a combination of all three—are important questions for future
research.It is important to note, however, that the ways in which these
systems work together in motivating increases in risky behav-
ior between childhood and adolescence are not necessarily the
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isky behavior between adolescence and adulthood. It is entirely
ossible, for example, that the increase in recklessness seen in
arly adolescence is due mainly to increases in reward sensitivity
hereas the decrease in recklessness seen in young adulthood
s driven mainly by improvements in cognitive control. It is also
ossible (albeit unlikely) that the initial increase and later decline
n risk taking seen during the transition between childhood and
dulthood is entirely explained by the rise and fall in socioemo-
ional reactivity and not related to changes in cognitive control.
hile advances in neuroscience have permitted researchers to
istinguish between these systems in studies of brain structure
nd function, these systems likely engage in ongoing interactions
ith one another, and it is therefore unwise to think about them
s if they are independent entities.
As we have asserted throughout this review, the weight of
he evidence amassed to date is consistent with the dual sys-
ems perspective. Although there are occasional exceptions to the
eneral trends, self-report, behavioral, and neuroimaging stud-
es generally support the model, ﬁnding that psychological and
eural manifestations of reward sensitivity increase between child-
ood and adolescence, peak sometime during the late teen years,
nd decline thereafter, whereas psychological and neural reﬂec-
ions of better cognitive control increase gradually and linearly
hroughout adolescence and into the early 20s, and that the
ombination of ampliﬁed reward sensitivity and still-developing
ognitive control makes middle and late adolescence a time of
eightened predisposition to risky and reckless behavior. Whether
his inclination translates into real-world risk-taking, however,
s contingent on the context in which adolescent development
ccurs.
In our view, the published research that has appeared since
he introduction of this viewpoint has strengthened, rather than
alled into question, the model’s utility. Of course, there have been
tudies yielding results inconsistent with one or more aspects of
he dual systems model. This is to be expected given the large
umber of relevant studies and wide variety of methodologies
mployed. Importantly, studies that have failed to support the
ual systems model have not provided consistent evidence for an
lternative developmental model. They do, however, serve as a
eminder that there may  be conditions under which the general
nding of heightened reward sensitivity in adolescence or age-
elated increases in cognitive control may  not apply. This highlights
he fact that, as we have pointed out, the dual systems perspective
s at times overly simplistic. As a heuristic device, however, the
odel provides a far better account of adolescent risk taking than
rior models that have attributed this period of transient reckless-
ess to adolescents’ cognitive deﬁciencies. It also continues to be
enerative, and has informed ongoing research in multiple ﬁelds,
esearch that will almost certainly support continued reﬁnement
f the model (reﬁnements already partially reﬂected in the mul-
iple variations of the perspective advanced by different research
roups).
Importantly, the dual systems model does not suggest that ado-
escents are universally risky or incompetent decision makers. On
he contrary, the model recognizes that basic reasoning capacity is
lmost fully mature by mid-adolescence. Indeed, under conditions
hat minimize arousal of the socioemotional system and allow for
eliberative, calculated decision making, adolescents tend to make
ecisions and judgments that are quite similar to those of adults
e.g., Chein et al., 2011; Figner et al., 2009; Van Leijenhorst et al.,
008). Instead, what the dual systems model suggests is that when
ecision making occurs under conditions that excite, or activate, the
ocioemotional system (e.g., when decisions are made in the pres-
nce of friends, under emotionally arousing circumstances, or when
here is a potential to obtain an immediate reward) adolescents are
ore prone than other age groups to pursue exciting, novel, andve Neuroscience 17 (2016) 103–117
risky courses of action. Far from being a biologically determinis-
tic model, the dual systems perspective explicitly emphasizes the
context in which decision making takes place.
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